African Entrepreneurship Record

Chapter 1327: Chapter 336: Horn of Africa War

An agreement has been reached with the United Kingdom, which means the East African Government will be busier in the next period.

Firstly, in terms of grand strategy, since East Africa and the United Kingdom have renegotiated on the Indian Ocean issue, East Africa needs to reconstruct the military and political strategic layout of the Indian Ocean and build a new system.

As Ernst often mentions, no matter how powerful a country is, its resources and capabilities are limited. Acquiring more colonies, regions, and military strongholds means expending more resources and manpower.

Because of East Africa’s overseas expansion actions in recent years, the total military strength of East Africa now exceeds 800,000, which is a very strong evidence.

After all, concerning East Africa’s homeland security, East Africa only needs four to five hundred thousand troops, or even less, to ensure the security of the homeland, mainly because there are no forces around East Africa’s homeland that can threaten it.

The root of East Africa’s massive military expansion lies in colonial expansion.

East Africa maintains a high troop deployment in East Kalimantan (Kalimantan Islands), the Kra Isthmus, Togoland (West Africa), and the Beibu Gulf (Persian Gulf) regions.

By 1918, East Africa’s overseas stationed troops had reached 430,000, with troop levels maintained at tens of thousands or more, even exceeding 100,000 in some regions, including near 200,000 stationed in the Kra Isthmus, Kalimantan Islands (including Lanfang Overseas Province), and Togoland.

Additionally, there are many overseas islands that evidently need personnel stationed, such as Alaska, New Guinea, North Hawaii Kingdom, Southern Ryukyu Islands, Nauru, Palau, etc.

The number of East Africa’s overseas stationed troops even surpasses that of the homeland stationed troops, and the primary reason for this result is East Africa’s overseas colonial policy.

East Africa’s overseas colonial policy is a typical ”high-cost colonization,” and it cannot even be referred to as ”colonization” in this sense.

Because East Africa implements the ”wheel flattening” policy overseas, which involves extreme policies of wiping out nations and races popular in ancient East Asia.

East Africa is arguably one of the most extreme and ruthless among the major powers, comparable to the Americans and Belgians before this century or Japan nowadays.

Even Europe’s national troops busy with World War I have much higher standards than East Africa’s overseas troops.

The British Indian colony, with over 300 million population and an area of over 3 million, has no more than 100,000 stationed troops.

In contrast, East Africa stations over 100,000 troops in the Kra Isthmus, a small area of only 50,000 square kilometers with just tens of thousands of population.

The reason sustaining East Africa’s extreme overseas colonial policy is simple: Ernst is responding to the anti-colonial wave of the 20th century from a previous life.

Other races are ultimately untrustworthy in the eyes of Ernst, and even ”puppet troops” are not considered. Ernst understands the irreversibility of world trends.

Thus, the colonial system is destined to collapse in the 20th century, and East Africa must prepare accordingly.

However, this inevitably means East Africa faces high costs of overseas colonization, besides the significant military expenditure it needs to bear strong logistical pressure, post-war reconstruction, immigration introduction, resource development, all requiring extensive effort, manpower, finances, and materials.

It can be said that East Africa’s overseas colonies are currently not profitable; rather, the East African Government invests massive amounts of money, and the benefit is clear: future control of these regions will be very stable.

This is why East Africa’s ”high-cost colonization” does not qualify as colonization.

Traditional colonization, like the British colonizing India, involves sending a small number of troops to acquire population, taxes, and production from the colony.

East Africa’s brutal method of eliminating ”native peoples” inevitably leads to intense military conflicts while disrupting existing productive orders.

Using East Africa’s colonial methods for India would mean not just failing to collect taxes but also having military budgets skyrocket, with uncertain success given India’s population of nearly 300 million, akin to physically eliminating three hundred million pigs.

With recent changes, East Africa needs to make large-scale strategic and military adjustments concerning the Indian Ocean.

The newly acquired territories from the United Kingdom and France will reshape East Africa’s military presence in the Indian Ocean. Not to mention Socotra Islands, Chagos Islands, and Rodrigues Island which are crucial for East Africa’s eastern homeland security, involving the reallocation of East Africa’s Indian Ocean Fleet.

Especially for the navy and air force, constructing fleet ports and airports is imperative in these places, with a large-scale military facility construction in Socotra Islands and Rodrigues Island, and reconstruction of the British leftover military facilities in Chagos Islands.

This is a systematic large project involving East Africa’s navy and air force operations in the Indian Ocean region.

Additionally, since East Africa intends to encompass the Horn of Africa, substantial military actions are apparent, leading to another wave of military expenditure.

The population in the Horn of Africa is small but the land area is vast, nearly 150,000 square kilometers of land requiring significant troop deployment to fully integrate it into East Africa’s homeland.

Furthermore, the East African Government’s verbal ”commitment” to intervene in Russian internal affairs is evidently another expense, even if merely a token gesture, some manpower and financial support are necessary.

So it’s foreseeable that East Africa will hardly idle in the coming period, which is exactly what the United Kingdom and France wish to see, as East Africa being preoccupied leaves it with no time to intervene in the European war.

Despite significant costs incurred by both countries, it’s still considered worthwhile compared to the upheaval caused by East Africa’s involvement during WWI.

Throughout WWI, East Africa remains busy not only on economic fronts but also with more frequent military actions.

While Europe engages in large battles, East Africa frequently engages in smaller overseas conflicts, making the Indian Ocean the world’s second-most war-torn region after Europe due to East Africa’s presence.

Moreover, its bloody nature is practically on par with the European battlefield; although many nations participate in European wars with high death counts, East Africa’s genocidal conquest wars trigger more psychological discomfort.

June 4, 1918.

The East African Government officially declared Hassan as a target for undermining navigation safety in Aden Bay and East Africa border safety.

Simultaneously, the northwest frontier defense forces of East Africa, starting from Dedradawa City, Elle Town, Dalor Town, Buholaide Village, among East Africa and British Somaliland’s intersection, formally commenced the Horn of Africa War.

The East African Navy’s Indian Ocean Fleet also sailed into Aden Bay from the waters between Socotra Islands and the Horn of Africa, taking over the eastern British-controlled area of Beyla Port.

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom started withdrawing its troops stationed in British Somaliland west of Beyla, covering the area up to French-controlled Djibouti, successfully contracting forces in the Horn of Africa.

The East African Government estimated deploying over 50,000 troops to counter the Horn of Africa, avoiding a repeat of previous lessons learned in the Beibu Gulf (Persian Gulf) territory.

East Africa’s operations in the Beibu Gulf territory were mediocre, and the Horn of Africa’s area is larger and more complex, with Arabian Sect forces represented by Hassan active in local mountainous areas.

This means conquering the Horn of Africa is as challenging as the previous Beibu Gulf territory expedition, if not more difficult, with East Africa already preparing for a long-term war.

The estimated time is roughly within two years for a basic suppression of resistances in the Horn of Africa, aligning with the General Staff’s expectations since stabilizing the Beibu Gulf territory took almost a year initially.