African Entrepreneurship Record

Therefore, the development of submarine technology in East Africa has been relatively independent from the start, whereas the development of surface ships is quite the opposite, with East Africa always being the chasing party.

It was only in recent years that East Africa’s shipbuilding industry framework has begun to shed its dependency on Europe, primarily owing to substantial investment in the shipbuilding industry in the ’90s.

In the ’90s, after the South African war, East Africa obtained several important ports in the West Coast Angola region, which enabled the two-ocean strategy to be fully established. Correspondingly, the East Africa Central Government constructed numerous shipbuilding enterprises on both the West Coast and East Coast, forming an independent shipbuilding industry structure. Coupled with the accumulation over six, seven, and eight decades, spanning more than twenty years, East Africa’s shipbuilding industry has become relatively mature.

However, in the field of shipbuilding industry, East Africa can only be considered a major power, not a strong power. The countries leading the global shipbuilding industry development are still the United Kingdom, and currently Germany’s shipbuilding industry is developing quite rapidly. Due to the different emphasis of the German Navy, Germany has formed competitiveness in the military-industrial shipbuilding field with the United Kingdom.

Regarding others, including East Africa, the shipbuilding industry is developing rapidly, especially in warships, but reaching the level of the UK and Germany will still require a long time.

Kain Math: ”Currently, our navy can only seek technological breakthroughs, unlike other countries, which expand their naval power crazily by building or importing a large number of warships. The Bajamojo has proven that our navy’s warship manufacturing has completely freed itself from reliance on European technology, and the manufacturing technology for surface ships is also among the world’s leaders,” said Handonio.

”Including the Far East Japan, which proposed the so-called Six-Six Fleet plan at the end of the ’90s, this country now has even a tendency to surpass our East Africa in naval aspects, so our navy’s defense pressure has increased greatly, especially in the Pacific Region, where defense is almost unsustainable.”

Japan’s Six-Six Fleet consists of six main battleships of over ten thousand tons and six armored cruisers as its core, bringing the tonnage of Japan’s navy’s main warships to 130,000 tons.

In addition to supportive ships, the strength of the Japanese Navy will exceed the combined naval forces of other countries in the Far East. Beyond the twelve main battleships, the Six-Six Fleet plan includes ten light cruisers, more than thirty torpedo boats and many supportive ships, with a total of one hundred and three newly built or externally purchased warships, having a total displacement reaching 153,000 tons.

And currently, East Africa’s main battleships, including the recently launched Bajamojo, only number four, so in recent years, the Japanese Navy has already surpassed the East African Navy in scale.

”Moreover, in recent years, the development of naval ships is hard to fathom, almost changing annually, the technology updates and iterations occurring exceptionally fast, intensifying the naval competition increasingly.”

”This technological update and iteration does not lead to fundamental change; various countries continue to escalate in warship technology, causing quite a serious resource waste. It’s hard to understand how Japan, being such a poor country, manages to accomplish this.”

Although East Africa’s construction speed of military surface ships seems slower compared to other countries, East Africa’s technological breakthroughs have steadily grown. Furthermore, with each year’s vigorous development in East Africa’s scientific technology field, the advancements have effectively propelled East Africa’s military-industrial shipbuilding industry.

While the previous three battleships before Bajamojo may seem without fundamental changes, there was substantial detailed maneuvering, accumulating rich experience for Bajamojo’s birth.

Kain Math used the example of the Japanese Navy because the Japanese Navy has developed to a level that East Africa must now pay attention to.

Before the Far East naval battle, Japan’s navy and East Africa’s had a considerable gap, now, it has become a maritime power slightly stronger than East Africa.

However, this doesn’t mean the East African Navy is declining, but rather the developmental paths of the two navies are different. Regarding Japan’s current main battleships, they are almost all externally purchased — first four from the United Kingdom, and subsequently two from Germany and France.

In contrast, East Africa’s four battleships are all designed and constructed domestically, and Japan’s Six-Six Fleet plan is not completely realized yet.

East Africa will similarly continue constructing one or two experimental battleships during the One-Five plan period. If the situation proceeds normally, by 1905, East Africa’s number of main battleships should be on par with Japan.

Nonetheless, because Tsarist Russia was ”giving away supplies” in the previous life, Japan captured large numbers of Russian ships, so after 1905, Japan’s navy might acquire a batch of new equipment, as evidenced by the Russo-Japanese War where Russia’s battleship ”Victory” was seized by the Japanese Navy and renamed Zhoufang.

Though, East Africa will not be completely overshadowed by Japan, even during the One-Five plan period, East Africa’s primary focus will be on industrial construction, with relatively slow military development. But, globally, it is not inferior.

Purely from the naval budget perspective, East Africa’s naval funding is still in an ascending phase, and since East Africa did not participate in any naval races, most of this funding is used for military equipment technology enhancements.

Japan, for its ”Six-Six Fleet plan,” its naval budget alone accounts for approximately fifty percent of the national development budget, not even including the army expenses.

Hence, Japan is more inclined towards militarism than history, and its military budget proportion is so high that the impact on Japan’s economy is visibly significant.

Of course, such actions align with Japan’s unique national conditions, as the current Japanese Government intends to compensate for the fiscal deficit through foreign aggression and expansion, thereby obtaining resources for domestic industrial development.

And the prerequisite for all this is Japan possessing a fleet capable of satisfying Japan’s aggressive needs to realize its strategic goals.

This is also ”gambling,” as relying on war to achieve one’s ambitions comes with enormous uncertainty; any war could potentially interrupt Japan’s national destiny.

For example, the previous life Russo-Japanese War, some estimated this war severely hampered both Japan’s and Russia’s development. Russia lost nearly half of its navy, suffered severe blows to national pride, and the Tsarist Government eventually collapsed, while Japan did not receive war reparations from Russia, and the war expenses were extraordinarily high, causing Japan’s economy to remain stagnant for at least twenty years.

Of course, Japan both gained and lost; the Russo-Japanese War cemented its status as a Great Power, and while Japan’s economy was severely impaired, it depends who you compare to. If compared to European countries, Japan forfeited an era’s developmental opportunity, but given Japan’s geographical positioning in the Far East, post-Russo-Japanese War, Japan had virtually no rivals in the Far East region.

Naturally, these developments have no relevance to the current East African Navy, which follows a relatively independent development path, especially post-’90s, fully transitioning into the domestic development wave.

Although East Africa has several colonies in the Pacific, their current economic value is not substantial, so there is no immediate requirement for a powerful navy for protection. Even losing them temporarily would not greatly affect East Africa, and East Africa’s domestic navy does not need overwhelming paper statistics to maintain deterrence temporarily.

Furthermore, the military domain requires evaluating industrial potential besides current strength. Prior to the World Wars, America’s military statistics were not outstanding, yet relying on immense industrial potential, it quickly expanded to a degree that left enemies in despair.

East Africa currently follows a similar rationale; while the East African Navy can potentially be expanded massively at any moment, doing so would impact East Africa’s economic development. Hence, it is wiser to first develop domestic industries.

The emphasis on different areas does not denote a disparity in strength; if faced with external threats, given East Africa’s current industry and population, it can swiftly organize a large troop force.