African Entrepreneurship Record

Chapter 1098: Chapter 107: Deal Between Two Nations

If war breaks out between the United Kingdom and East Africa, it would naturally manifest on both naval and land fronts. Among the major powers of the world, the British Army is considered the weakest, so any conflict between the two nations would inevitably focus on naval warfare.

On the surface, the British Royal Navy is far superior to East Africa. The Royal Navy’s strength is five times that of East Africa, with a total tonnage of around a staggering two million tons, whereas the total tonnage of the East African Navy has just surpassed four hundred thousand tons.

Currently, by total tonnage, the East African Navy ranks sixth in the world, following the order: UK, US, Germany, France, Japan, and East Africa.

Japan, after benefiting from Russia’s ship donations, has a navy with a total tonnage of over four hundred thousand tons, currently ranking above East Africa, while the combined tonnage of the US, Germany, and France exceeds eight hundred thousand tons, with no significant differences among the three.

In this light, the position of the East African Navy among the world’s great naval powers is not prominent, but considering the quality of the warships, the East African Navy should rank fifth in the world.

Although the Japanese Navy is larger than East Africa’s, many of its ships are outdated Russian prizes, and East Africa also has advantages in dreadnoughts and submarines.

Despite this, the disparity between the East African Navy and those of the UK, US, Germany, and France remains significant, highlighting the pressing need for East Africa to resume the naval arms race.

Being too far behind other countries might not turn East Africa into an easy target for other great powers, but it would make it difficult for East Africa to gain even a small advantage in the changing international landscape.

On this basis, the US, Germany, and France are already doggedly catching up with the UK; the UK is forced to adopt a two-power standard to maintain its naval advantage. The more countries involved, the more the UK finds itself stretched thin, which is a primary reason why the UK is anxious for East Africa to halt its naval arms race.

As for waging war to force the East African Navy to stop the arms race, the UK can’t afford this risk. It’s only been a few years since the Russo-Japanese naval war, where Japan defeated a stronger adversary; the East African Navy might achieve similar results, although the probability is low.

If the UK suffered a catastrophic defeat similar to Russia’s and faced competition from the German and French navies in Europe, the consequences would be unimaginable.

Naturally, the UK does not wish to go to war with East Africa, and East Africa likewise does not want to be used as a tool for others. Adding to this, Russell has already conceded, and Ernst naturally wouldn’t pass up the opportunity to extort something from the British government.

Ernst deliberately said, ”Becoming a great naval power has always been an important goal for us in East Africa. Although we cannot match your Royal Navy’s formidable sea power, we should not lag too far behind the US, Germany, and France. Thus, your country requesting us to voluntarily stop the naval arms race is unrealistic. Changes in the world naval order demand that East Africa possess strong maritime power to ensure its status and interests.”

Ernst’s words did not surprise Russell. It is understandable for East Africa, as a great power, to develop its maritime capabilities. After all, even Japan could temporarily surpass East Africa; if the roles were reversed, Russell probably wouldn’t accept it either.

However, Ernst’s earlier words clearly contained an underlying message. While halting the naval arms race is unrealistic, there is flexibility regarding the extent of participation.

Assuming, as Ernst suggested, that the East African Navy aims to match the US, Germany, and France, it would be extremely disadvantageous for the UK. Currently, the combined naval tonnage of the three nations approaches one million tons, and this is far from their limit.

The US, Germany, and France are actively expanding their navies, meaning East Africa’s targets are also moving. If, in the future, the three nations’ navies exceed two million tons, would East Africa also follow suit to two million, or even surpass that?

After all, Japan, despite its madness, has pushed its naval tonnage to over four hundred thousand tons. Given East Africa’s national power is evidently stronger than Japan’s, if the East African Government adopts Japan’s naval development model, establishing a navy that surpasses its national might would not be impossible.

Moreover, the British government regards East Africa as a world power on par with France, so the minimum benchmark for East African naval capabilities should be France; the upper limit is difficult to predict.

No matter which model the East African Navy chooses in the future, it won’t be good news for the UK. It signifies a naval power no weaker than the US, Germany, and France rising in the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic, which would not be easily interfered with by the UK.

Should East Africa use this to dominate the Indian Ocean, the difficulty would be minimal, given that the Royal Navy cannot be concentrated in one place. For example, the Royal Navy in both the North Atlantic and Mediterranean cannot easily be redeployed.

Were it to reach that point, British colonies on the Indian Ocean coast, such as India, along with colonial holdings in the Far East, would be at great risk, which is something the UK absolutely cannot accept.

Understanding this only strengthened Russell’s resolve to limit the East African Navy’s size; if the East African Navy rises, it might trigger the collapse of British hegemony.

Drenched in cold sweat, Russell hurriedly said to Ernst, ”Britain absolutely harbors no intention to threaten or limit East Africa’s development. We are essentially aiming to maintain regional stability. To demonstrate the Empire’s goodwill, we are willing to make significant concessions to East Africa on issues concerning the Persian Gulf and South America, on the condition that East Africa keeps its naval size within a low-risk range.”

This assurance from Russell represents the UK’s baseline. If East Africa plays hardball, the UK could only eliminate the danger in its infancy. Although this perilous seedling from East Africa is somewhat robust, the UK undoubtedly possesses the determination to address British hegemony issues.

By this point, Ernst’s objective had been achieved. Ernst believed that, at this stage, East Africa indeed did not yet have the capacity to challenge the UK, nor was there a need to do so, so it was best to seize the opportunity and retreat at the right moment.

Therefore, Ernst said, ”Our demands from East Africa are quite simple: one is to ensure our country has a fairer competitive environment in the international market, not limited to South America; the other is that we in East Africa should acquire corresponding interests in the Indian Ocean region, especially stable overseas footholds to support East Africa in protecting its national interests.”

In summary, Ernst’s words boiled down to five words: market access and territory.

The need for markets is easy to understand. Since the completion of the Two-Five Plan, East Africa’s industrial development has reached a bottleneck, with an especially urgent need for overseas markets. Ernst previously mentioned that East Africa represents a population of one hundred million, yet the world offers a vast market of two billion.

The global market is primarily controlled by the British, and under the order dominated by British colonies, the UK is essentially the market’s real controller. East African industrial expansion abroad cannot bypass the UK.

Therefore, if the UK proactively gives up part of the market, even just providing a level playing field for East Africa would greatly benefit current East African industrial development.

Regarding territorial demands, Ernst was more subtle. Along the Indian Ocean coast, apart from its own territory, East Africa lacks strategic footholds. Specifically, this involves the Red Sea coast, Arabian Sea coast, Persian Gulf coast, and Eastern Indian Ocean region.

Thus, East Africa urgently needs to build its sphere of influence in these areas, further expanding East Africa’s impact on the Indian Ocean coast, yet this too cannot bypass British control.

As Russell considered, if East Africa cannot acquire territories through other means, it would have to seize them forcibly from the UK by war, but only after the East African Navy becomes powerful enough.

Ernst added, ”Of course, differences will surely exist, but as long as both countries are willing to negotiate, no problem is insurmountable. Details can be discussed further between the East African Government and your country.”