African Entrepreneurship Record

Chapter 1066: Chapter 75: Persian Gulf

While East Africa’s Second Five-Year Plan was underway, the world of 1907 was far from peaceful. Contradictions among European states were growing increasingly acute, with the conflict between the German and French in particular standing out, clearly influenced to a certain extent by the economic crisis.

The relationship between the United Kingdom and Russia also underwent a certain degree of change. In the Russo-Japanese War, Russia was the biggest loser, but the aftereffects were not entirely unfavorable to Russia. For example, on the Central Asia issue, Russia and the United Kingdom reached a compromise; the two countries reopened negotiations over regions such as Persia and Afghanistan, and the reasons behind the warming of their relations were relatively complex.

”The United Kingdom and Russia may have reached some sort of tacit understanding over Central Asia and the Northwest Region of the Far East Empire. With Russia’s dismal performance in the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian threat has been greatly discounted in the eyes of the British. Meanwhile, after the economic crisis, the Russo-Japanese War, and domestic movements, the plight of the Tsarist government has also forced them to improve relations with the United Kingdom.”

”However, the compromise between the two countries in this contentious region of Central Asia will create certain unfavorable effects for us. Central Asia, including countries such as Afghanistan, as well as Persia in the Middle East, are among the key export destinations for our goods. In the past, by exploiting the Anglo-Russian contradiction, we were able to fish in troubled waters. Once the United Kingdom and Russia delineate their respective spheres of influence, it will obviously be detrimental to our export of goods.”

By leveraging the connections of the Omanis (originally Zanzibar Merchants), East Africa had long since opened trade with Central Asia and the countries along the Persian Gulf.

The United Kingdom and Russia, as the main participants in the regional order, had previously failed to reach consensus due to various differences. This also ensured the smoothness of East Africa’s trade there, so an Anglo-Russian ”reconciliation” would inevitably impact East Africa’s interests.

Listening to the analysis from the intelligence services, Ernst’s mood was rather heavy. Like the United States, East Africa, although not keen on participating in international politics for the time being, would not waver on safeguarding the core interests of its own economic development.

For example, the United States’ ”Monroe Doctrine” and the recently proposed ”Open Door” policy are, in essence, about the expansion of the U.S. economic sphere of influence, a sign that American industrial goods were moving from America onto the world stage.

East Africa had not previously had an ”African version” of the Monroe Doctrine, but through its influence on neighboring countries it had roughly formed an ”East African Economic Zone”. It is just that the value of this economic zone is far inferior to the sphere of influence the United States has built in North America; Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean Countries are by no means comparable to states or colonies such as the Abyssinia Empire and the Southern German Kingdom.

Moreover, the U.S. Monroe Doctrine is a clearly articulated political proposition, whereas the East African Economic Zone has yet to take shape as a distinct political and economic concept. The main reason is that neighboring British and French colonies are relatively strong and, unlike South America, do not enjoy a higher degree of autonomy.

Of course, East Africa’s current reluctance to expand the scope of the East African Economic Zone is also related to consolidating a peaceful external environment for development. This tacit-rule form of interest exchange has indeed greatly eased relations between East Africa and other countries.

The situation in Central Asia and along the Persian Gulf, however, is different. East Africa naturally attaches importance to the Indian Ocean Coast. After all, most of East Africa’s coastline lies along the Indian Ocean, making it the largest Great Power on the Indian Ocean Coast, and this has long driven East Africa to seek a bigger role in the Indian Ocean.

East Africa divides the Indian Ocean into roughly five sectors: the Nanyang sector, the Oceania sector, the India sector, the Arabian Sect sector, and the Africa sector.

Among these, the core of the Oceania sector is Australia, which, like India, is an undisputed British colony, and British influence is also very strong in the other sectors.

For instance, in the Africa sector there are Egypt and British Somaliland; in the Arabian Sect sector there are Yemen, Oman, various principalities on the West Coast of the Persian Gulf (such as the United Arab Emirates), and Persia, all of which either contain British colonies or are British protectorates; the Nanyang sector is similar.

Thus, on the Indian Ocean—which East Africa regards as a future core interest area—the United Kingdom is East Africa’s biggest obstacle. As for other states, their threat is far smaller than that of the United Kingdom.

If East Africa wants to dismantle British spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean, it naturally must move step by step, starting with the Arabian Sect sector and the Nanyang sector where British control is relatively weaker, and leaving for last Egypt (Red Sea), Australia, and India, which are the core British colonies on the Indian Ocean Coast.

Among these sectors, the Arabian Sect sector is the easiest to intervene in, because the region still includes relatively independent states such as Persia and the Ottoman. Once the United Kingdom and Russia fix their respective spheres of influence, it will become much harder for East Africa to get involved in the future.

This is the same reason why, when the Great Powers were carving out spheres of influence in the Far East Empire, the United States proposed the ”Open Door” policy—to prevent other countries from excluding U.S. interests.

If East Africa were to adopt a non-intervention stance toward Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would face the same kind of choice as the United States. Therefore, to maintain its interests in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf Region, and to plant pieces in the region for future use, East Africa cannot remain indifferent.

”The moves of the United Kingdom and Russia have almost no impact on the Ottoman Empire, so the Ottoman Empire will inevitably choose to ’play dead’. If we want to intervene in regional affairs, we can only take Persia as our main handle. Although we may not be able to stop the United Kingdom and Russia, we must at least ensure our own say and economic interests in the region.”

East Africa’s trade activities with Central Asia and the countries along the Persian Gulf are extremely convenient—not only is the distance short, but transport is by sea, making costs minimal. This has allowed East African industrial products in recent years to sweep through the region, creating a vast web of interests, so East Africa cannot easily abandon its stake there.

Of course, East Africa is also unlikely to go to direct war with the United Kingdom and Russia over this, since the East African Navy does not have a significant advantage over either country.

Under these circumstances, if East Africa wants to intervene in this region, it can only do so by supporting proxies, and given the current timid and risk-averse posture of the Ottoman Empire, it cannot be counted on.

Persia thus becomes East Africa’s only option. Persia has always been one of the traditional Great Powers in the Middle East and Central Asia and wields enormous influence in the region.

Moreover, in this round of negotiations between the United Kingdom and Russia, the negative impact on Persia is the greatest. Using the Persian Gulf as the dividing line, the two powers have all but split Persia in two, which certainly harms Persian interests.

However, modern Persia has declined sharply; its domestic industrial and military strength is weak. Without foreign support, in the face of the tacit understanding between the United Kingdom and Russia, it will likely have no choice but to submit.

”Politically, Persia has long tended to lean mainly toward the United Kingdom, though there are factions leaning toward Russia as well. But the formation of these factions is mainly due to having had no other options in the past. There is also a large amount of resistance within the country. We can fully influence Persian domestic politics by supporting other forces, thereby creating trouble for the United Kingdom and Russia and forcing both countries to take our interests seriously.”

Intervening in Persia is the best option currently available to the East African Government. Although it will cause displeasure in both the United Kingdom and Russia, there is ample room for maneuver. This is not a core interest area for the Three Kingdoms, so even if disputes arise, the contradictions will not escalate; at most, countries in the region will suffer more from war and chaos, which is not something the Three Kingdoms need to concern themselves with.

After a round of discussion, the East African Government ultimately decided to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia and other countries, and to join the United Kingdom and Russia in the partition of the Persian Gulf Region.

After all, if East Africa does not intervene, it will not only be excluded from the region but may even lose its original vested interests, which is unacceptable for East Africa.

And East Africa’s entry will inevitably make the situation along the Persian Gulf Coast even more tense. In Ernst’s view, if East Africa wants to expand its influence along the Indian Ocean Coast, it must seize this opportunity. If successful, it will not only secure East Africa’s vested interests, but will also help lay out East Africa’s future posture in the field of energy security.

The stakes behind the Persian Gulf are simply too great; Ernst cannot possibly let slip any opportunity to intervene. If they shrink back now, then once oil resources are laid bare in the future, it will be even harder for East Africa to interfere.