African Entrepreneurship Record

Chapter 1067: Chapter 76: Geopolitical Game

The United Kingdom and Russia can be said to be inherently opposed, thus extending a Great Game that lasted for a century, a game later inherited by the Soviet Union and Russia, though the United Kingdom, due to a decline in national strength, was replaced by the United States as the player.

This can be simply understood as the geopolitical dispute over world dominance between the Slavs and Anglo-Saxons people, involving three key regions: Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East (and Central Asia). Europe, needless to say, has witnessed hundreds of years of conflict between Western countries and Russia; the Middle East and Central Asia are also hotspots of contention, with the Russo-Japanese War reflecting the conflicts in the Far East.

When Europe’s strength is robust, Russia struggles to exert influence there, leading Russia to shift its focus to the Middle East and Central Asia, ultimately choosing the Far East.

In fact, examining Russia’s actions from the 19th century to early 20th century shows this pattern: first being blocked by the United Kingdom and France in Crimea, followed by the Russian-Turkish War, and finally the Russo-Japanese War.

In the geopolitical disputes between Russia and the United Kingdom, Persia occupies a crucial junction. The United Kingdom aimed to establish a land corridor in the Middle East and Central Asia connecting India, involving India, Afghanistan, Persia, the Ottoman Empire, ultimately linking to the Mediterranean.

Of course, the United Kingdom had an alternative plan, which was to bypass by controlling Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and other countries on the west coast of the Persian Gulf.

The motivation for forming the alternative plan lay in the United Kingdom facing a disadvantage in the game against Tsarist Russia, unable to control Persia and Afghanistan, preventing Tsarist Russia from severing the connection between the United Kingdom and India.

In fact, in past lives, Africa was also crucial in Britain’s scheming layout. If Britain deployed a horizontal land strategy corridor in the Middle East and Central Asia, it similarly designed a vertical land corridor in Africa, namely the two C Plan from Cape Town to Cairo.

The intersection of the vertical and horizontal routes was Egypt, where Britain could indirectly control much of Europe, Asia, and Africa, thanks to its formidable influence in the Mediterranean.

However, due to East Africa, Britain’s two C Plan naturally couldn’t materialize, as the presence of East Africa could be said to cripple a leg of Britain’s century-long layout.

Fortunately, Africa didn’t receive much attention from various countries until later times; had it been just a bit later, East Africa wouldn’t have established itself so smoothly due to British intervention.

In contrast to East Africa, Tsarist Russia posed a greater threat to Britain; although East Africa held nearly half of Africa, its capacity to intervene outside the region paled compared to Tsarist Russia.

Tsarist Russia was situated at the center of the Eurasian continent, capable of striking in multiple directions; if any direction couldn’t be blocked, Russia would advance further on the Eurasian continent.

Thus, countries worldwide were bound to expend considerable effort to curtail Russia’s expansion, as seen in the Baltic direction, Central Europe direction, Black Sea and Mediterranean direction, Middle East direction, Central Asia direction, Far East direction.

Any area where Russia gained an advantage would enable Russia to acquire more favorable sea access points, coupled with land power superiority, making it even more challenging to suppress Russia.

In contrast, East Africa is hindered by the Sahara Desert in the north, restricting exchanges between East Africa and Europe, Asia; while East Africa has advantages of two oceans, at this stage the East African Navy isn’t strong enough to pose a threat to Britain, and launching from the sea doesn’t match Tsarist Russia’s ease from land; in nautical warfare, the British exert pressure on potential enemies with their powerful navy, whereas Tsarist Russia striking from land isn’t easily suppressed by Britain.

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Rhein City.

To respond to changes between the United Kingdom and Russia in the Middle East and Central Asia, East Africa, including its military, security bureau, and other governmental departments, conducted targeted discussions.

Staff member Cristiano, holding a triangular ruler and pencil, mapped on paper: ”Starting from Central Asia, if connected to Persia, Tsarist Russia could acquire its long-coveted Indian Ocean exit, or covet India’s rich colonies via Afghanistan, which is the key conflict point between Britain and Tsarist Russia.”

”Conversely, Britain’s layout in the Middle East and Central Asia restricts Russia’s southern sea access, hence the protracted inability to reach agreement; the Russian-Turkish War, Afghanistan War are specific manifestations of this struggle.”

”From the perspective of both layouts, draw two lines: one from Russia’s south, through Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, the other from Ottoman Empire’s Syria to the Persian Gulf then India, with their intersection at Persia.”

Cristiano lightly sketched the core interest lines of the United Kingdom and Russia in the region, evoking a sense of oppression among other members of the East African Government.

”This is the Empire. Speaking purely from the map, the Empire should occupy a significant stake in the Middle East and Central Asia, for we can influence here by virtue of convenient maritime conditions, but the fact is our Empire has long lacked political influence in the Middle East and Central Asia.” stated Empire’s Foreign Minister Frier.

From the northern tip of East Africa in Mogadishu to the Persian Gulf is merely over three thousand kilometers, a distance not too far by sea, and hardly any barriers intervening, making shipping between East Africa and the Persian Gulf very convenient.

Overall, the advantage is far greater than the United Kingdom and Russia; while Russia is closest to the Persian Gulf, it’s mostly land-connected, with high land transportation costs, and the United Kingdom’s homeland is thousands of miles away, having to traverse Gibraltar Strait, Suez Canal, Mand Strait or round the Cape of Good Hope.

Frier continued: ”If we want to break the United Kingdom and Russia’s monopoly over this region, we must join in the competition concerning the Middle East and Central Asia. Though our current naval prowess pales next to Britain, Britain’s main navy is concentrated in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean; our operational space in the Indian Ocean is considerable.”

”Concerning Russia, we can also block Russia’s southern advance through maritime routes and local force support, although Britain deploying the same strategy implies potential alignment in interests with Britain when intervening in the Middle East and Central Asia.”

The triangle represents stability, indicating that East Africa’s participation will further complicate the situation along the Persian Gulf coast; relations among the United Kingdom, Russia, and East Africa are quite intricate, meaning even if East Africa temporarily intervenes, it won’t significantly disrupt geopolitics; at least in the short term, no party among the United Kingdom, Russia, or East Africa can claim absolute dominance easily.

Ernst stated: ”Our ultimate goal isn’t to enter irrevocable conflicts with either Britain or Russia. The United States has already illustrated this for us in the Far East Empire, so we should similarly join under the guise of trade maintenance, thereby compelling Britain and Russia to concede to some extent.”

Even if East Africa harbors ambitions for territories along the Persian Gulf, it can’t achieve them overnight; just developing local forces would be a considerable expenditure of time, and neither Britain nor Russia would shrink back due to East Africa’s involvement, as East Africa lacks such capability.

In previous eras, America’s entry into the Persian Gulf effectively meant inheriting Britain’s assets, like the naval base in Bahrain, which was Britain’s naval core in the Persian Gulf; Britain’s withdrawal was necessitated by the two World Wars reducing Britain to a second-rate country, compelling compromise; yet even in such circumstances, Britain’s local influence persisted for at least several decades.

Thus, East Africa joining yields no immediate effect unless both Britain and Russia suddenly decline dramatically, which also requires consideration of local countries and regional factors, such as Persia and other nations arising in past times hindering America’s overwhelming dominance in the Middle East. Consequently, any significant maneuvering by East Africa in the Middle East and Central Asia will necessitate a painstakingly long-term strategy.

”In the Middle East and Central Asia, we must adhere to certain objective realities: first and foremost, we can’t allow Russia to profit. Should it be our actions leading Russia to acquire Indian Ocean sea outlets, it would spell disaster for the Empire. Therefore, in obstructing Russia, our goals align with Britain’s.”